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This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the ﬁeld of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of
advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties
have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then
assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more
regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review
Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting
their work from malign misuse.
1.Introduction
Article I of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) reads [1]:
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
never in any circumstances to develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or
toxins whatever their origin or method of
production, of types and in quantities that have
no justiﬁcation for prophylactic, protective or
other peaceful purposes,
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile
purposes or in armed conﬂict.”
The sweeping prohibition of the nonpeaceful uses of agents
or toxins set out in Article I.1 has become known as the
General Purpose Criterion, and the statement “never in any
circumstances” indicates that the negotiators in the early
1970s intended the prohibition to apply then, now, and into
the future. The wording of Article I.2 “for hostile purposes
or in armed conﬂict” also indicates the wide scope that the
negotiators had in mind for the prohibition.
However, the BTWC also states in Article XII that:
“Five years after the entry into force of this
Convention...ac o n f e r e n c eo fS t a t e sP a r t i e s
to the Convention shall be held at Geneva,
Switzerland, to review the operation of the
Convention, with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the preamble and the provisions
of the Convention...are being realized. Such
review shall take into account any new scientiﬁc
and technological developments relevant to the
Convention.”
T h el a s ts e n t e n c eo fA r t i c l eX I Im a yp e r h a p sb es e e na sa n
indicationthatalready,intheearly1970s,thenegotiatorshad
a concern that very rapid advances were being made in the
life sciences and that these might lead to the production of
newmaterials,technologies,orknowledgewhichwouldneed
to be taken into account in order to maintain and strengthen
the prohibition.
As it turned out, at the First Review Conference in 1980
the States Parties’ conclusion in their Final Declaration was
relatively sanguine on this point. Under Article I there were
just two paragraphs stating [2]:2 Biotechnology Research International
“The conference notes the importance of Article
I as the article which deﬁnes the scope of the
Convention and reaﬃrms its support for the
provisions of this Article.
The Conference believes that Article I has
proved suﬃciently comprehensive to have cov-
ered recent scientiﬁc and technological develop-
ments relevant to the Convention.”
Additionally, under Article XII, the Final Declaration stated:
“The Conference...believes that such confer-
ences constitute an eﬀective method of review-
ing the operation of the Convention with a view
of assuring that its purposes and provisions are
being realized, in particular with respect to any
new scientiﬁc and technological developments
relevant to the Convention.”
The Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference
had requested the Depositary Governments—the USSR, the
USA, and the UK—to prepare a background paper on new
scientiﬁc and technological developments relevant to the
Convention and to provide the paper to all the States Parties
prior to the Review Conference and had invited other States
Parties to do so if they wished. Clearly, this mechanism
was found satisfactory at the First Review Conference and,
although the joint paper by the Depositary States was not
repeated, the mechanism developed into a means by which
any State Party to the Convention could contribute to the
background paper prepared for the following ﬁve-yearly
Review Conferences. As shown in Table 1, though not many
States Parties have chosen to make such contributions, a
small number have regularly done so.
2. Scientiﬁcand Technological Developments
Relevant to the Convention
ThesanguineattitudeoftheFirstReviewConferencetowards
scientiﬁc and technological developments relevant to the
BTWC did not last long. Indeed, even at the time of the
First Review Conference a contribution by Sweden had
noted the considerable recent progress in “cell-genetics and
biotechnology, particularly in the areas of gene and enzyme
technology.” It went on to point out the implications of the
new genetic techniques that, it suggested:
“...imply a potential to change existing poten-
tial BW-agents, for example, in order to increase
their ability to survive in diﬀerent environ-
ments. Genes with the ability to induce resis-
tance against diﬀerent types of antimicrobial
agents (including antibiotics and disinfectants)
could also possibly be regarded as potential
BW-agents. It cannot be excluded that new
BW-agents (e.g., combinations between existing
viruses or combinations between viruses and
other genes) could be constructed with this
technique...”
Table 1: States parties’ contributions to the background paper on
scientiﬁc and technological developments.
State 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Total
P a r t y R CR CR CR CR CR C
USSR/Russia
√∗ √
2
USA
√∗ √√√√
5
UK
√∗ √√√√√
6
Hungary
√
1
Sweden
√√√ √√
5
Czechoslovakia
√√
2
Denmark
√√
2
Australia
√√
2
Canada
√
1
Cuba
√
1
Finland
√
1
Switzerland
√
1
Bulgaria
√
1
South Africa
√
1
Argentina
√
1
Czech Republic
√
1
Netherlands
√
1
Portugal
√
1
Secretariat
√
1
Total 3 4 7 5 5 10 36
∗Joint submission by the three Depositary States.
As is clear from the contributions made by various States
Parties to the scientiﬁc and technological developments
background papers for the following the ﬁve-year Review
Conferences of 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2006, these and other
such possibilities have come to fruition and led to the state-
ments in Final Declarations relating to Article I expressing
both clearer appreciations and more apprehensions than
were expressed in 1980.
The Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference in
2006 had four paragraphs related to Article I. The ﬁrst two
paragraphs stressed the comprehensive coverage of science
and technology as follows:
“(1) The Conference reaﬃrms the importance
of Article I, as it deﬁnes the scope of the Con-
vention. The Conference declares that the Con-
ventioniscomprehensiveinitsscopeandthatall
naturally or artiﬁcially created or altered micro-
bial and other biological agents and toxins, as
well as their components, regardless of their
origin and method of production and whether
they aﬀect humans, animals or plants, of types
and in quantities that have no justiﬁcation
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes,areunequivocallycoveredbyArticleI.
(2) The Conference reaﬃrms that Article I
applies to all scientiﬁc and technological devel-
opmentsinthelifesciencesandinotherﬁeldsof
science relevant to the Convention.”Biotechnology Research International 3
Table 2: Topics covered in the main body of the UK’s contribution
to the 2001 Background Paper∗.
Genomics and proteomics
Bioinformatics
Human Genome Project and human diversity
Gene therapy
Virulence and pathogenicity
Vaccines and novel therapies
Recombinant protein expression
Toxins and other bioactive molecules
Detection and identiﬁcation technologies
Human infectious disease patterns
Smallpox destruction
Drug resistance
Disease in agriculture
Pest control in agriculture
Global initiatives to tackle disease
Molecular biology applications and crops
Trends in protein production technologies
International cooperation and biosafety: activities under the
Biodiversity Convention
Means of delivery of agents and toxins
Use of pathogens to control weeds and “criminal” crops
Bioremediation: the destruction of material
Countering the threat of BW terrorism
Impact of the entry into force of the CWC
∗From [4].
It should also be understood that the word “toxin” here
has a much wider meaning than would normally be
understood by a biologist. As explained in the 2004 World
Health Organization guidance [3], “toxin” here includes
midspectrum agents such as bioregulatory chemicals like
neurotransmitters, hormones, and cytokines of the nervous,
endocrine, and immune systems. There is thus an overlap
of coverage for such midspectrum agents as they are
clearly also covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).
An idea of the range of scientiﬁc and technological
developmentstopicsconsideredrelevantbyStatesPartiescan
be gained from a listing of the sections of the main body of
the exceptionally large contribution made by the UK in 2001
(Table 2).
Someofthesubjectsconsidered—forexample,improved
detection and treatment capabilities—would be beneﬁcial
to the maintenance of the prohibition, but clearly many of
the developments could increase the possibilities of misuse.
This detailed review by the UK was an annex to a short
introductory section which summarised the main bearing
of the detailed review. In this regard, the ﬁnal paragraph of
the introduction is of particular importance for the further
discussion that I wish to return to at the end of this paper.
The UK’s introduction ended as follows:
“Throughout the various studies and consul-
tations carried out by the UK to inform this
review, it has been clear that the rate of change
in science and technology ﬁelds relevant to the
BTWC has been much greater than in the pre-
vious ﬁve year period, that is between the third
and fourth Review Conferences....Given the
accelerating pace in science and technology, the
UK wonders whether it is prudent to maintain
a ﬁve year gap between such assessments under
the BTWC...”
The paragraph went on to state:
“...The UK suggests that the upcoming Review
Conference consider establishing a mechanism
for States Parties to work together on a more
frequent basis to conduct such scientiﬁc and
technical reviews and to consider any implica-
tions at the necessary level of expertise.”
This idea, along with much else, was lost in the catastrophic
Fifth Review Conference of 2001-2, but it is important to
note that the UK’s contribution for the 2006 Sixth Review
Conference reiterated the point:
“...given the accelerating pace of developments
in science and technology in general, the UK
continues to hold the view, as expressed in its
paper for the Fifth Review Conference, that the
Review Conference should consider a process
of more frequent, perhaps annual, assessments
of scientiﬁc and technological developments
relevant to the BTWC.”
Again nothing came of this idea at the 2006 Review Confer-
ence, but perhaps development of the current Intersessional
Process (ISP) will allow some such review mechanism to
be implemented at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011,
for it seems to me that the scope and pace of change in
relevant science and technology has certainly not slackened.
Indeed, I think that if we are not very careful, scientiﬁc and
technological advances could threaten the whole chemical
and biological prohibition regime.
3. Neuropeptides
In order to substantiate such a claim it is necessary to go
beyond general surveys and statements and to look in more
detail at particular ﬁelds of relevant science and technology
in order to show that there is a real threat to the regime.
Much of the debate about biological weapons since the turn
of the century has taken place in the United States and has
focusedonthepossibilitythatbenignlyintendedcivilscience
and technology might produce materials, technologies, and
knowledge that could later be misused by others in acts of
bioterrorism. The presentthreat of bioterrorism has been4 Biotechnology Research International
wildly exaggerated, but several reports by the US National
Academies have served to alert the scientiﬁc community
to the dangers. The ﬁrst report, by a committee headed by
Gerald Fink, suggested that there were some seven classes of
experiments with pathogens that were of suﬃcient concern
to warrant review on the grounds of biosecurity before
they were carried out and recommended that a national
body be set up to oversee the development of such an
oversight system. The US National Science Advisory Board
for Biosecurity (NSABB) has struggled in a commendably
open manner with this task for several years following its
foundation by the Bush Administration. A second report, by
the Lemon-Relman committee, greatly widened the range of
concerns, suggesting in its Recommendation 2b that it was
necessary to [5]:
“Adoptabroadenedawarenessofthreatsbeyond
theclassical“selectagents”andotherpathogenic
organismsandtoxins,soastoinclude,forexam-
ple, approaches for disrupting host homeostatic
and defense systems and for creating synthetic
organisms.”
Host homeostatic systems are controlled by midspectrum
bioregulators such as hormones and neurotransmitters and
the defense system is controlled by the cytokines of the
immune system.
The Lemon-Relman committee’s oﬃcial title was the
Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention
of their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats.
Of course, one reaction to their report might well be
that there is always a long gap between the publication
of scientiﬁc papers and the actual implementation of their
ﬁndings in ways that aﬀect the real world. In that view, we do
notneedtogetoverexcitedbythecommittee’sconcernabout
midspectrum agents. However, that would be to ignore the
background papers on science and technology developments
relevant to the BTWC. For example, the Canadian contribu-
tion to the background paper in 1991 stated:
“Canada is pleased to provide the document
entitled “Novel Toxins and Bioregulators: the
Emerging Scientiﬁc and Technological Issues
Relating to Veriﬁcation and the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention”.”
The document itself [6] is 56 pages long and discusses a
wide range of novel toxins and bioregulators as set out in
Table 3.
The endorphins and enkephalins, for example, elicit
morphine-like eﬀects and these can be reversed by the opiate
antagonist naxolone, while oxytocin and vasopressin have
functionsin a wide rangeof behaviours suchasreproduction
and social attachment.
The contribution of the United States for the 1991
background document was conﬁned to the oﬃcial paper, but
it contained a remarkable section on the dangers created by
Table 3: Novel toxins and bioregulators discussed in the Canadian
Document for the 1991 Third Review Conference∗.
Conotoxins
Sarafotoxin-Endothelin
Bioregulators
Substance P
Thyroliberin (TRF)
Gonadoliberin (LRF)
Somatostatin (SS)
Neurotensin (NT)
Bombesin (BN)
Endorphins and Enkephalins
Dynorphin
Ocytocin and Vasopressin
Other Peptides
∗From Section 3 of [6].
the increasing understanding of the role of peptides in living
organisms. The section began by deﬁning peptides:
“...peptides are precursors of proteins made up
of amino acids. They are interesting molecules
for many reasons. They are active at very low
concentrations (one part per billion or trillion)
which makes their detection very diﬃcult. They
can be successfully modiﬁed as agonists (more
active products) or antagonists (having a con-
trary activity)...”
It then turned to their functions:
“Their range of activity covers the entire living
system, from mental processes (e.g., endor-
phins) to many aspects of health such as control
of mood, consciousness, temperature control,
sleep,oremotions,exertingregulatoryeﬀectson
the body...”
and to the dangers of misuse:
“...Evenasmallimbalanceinthesenaturalsub-
stances could have serious consequences, induc-
ing fear, fatigue, depression or incapacitation.
These substances would be extremely diﬃcult to
detect but could cause serious consequences or
even death if used improperly...”
So, whilst it is certainly true that advances in genetic engi-
neering technology allowed a much better understanding of
many new peptides (neuropeptides) that function within the
brainduringthe1990s,thedangersinthepotentialmisuseof
this new knowledge were clearly understood by States Parties
to the BTWC at the start of that decade.
4.Advances inNeuroscience
It is against that background that we must view the very
rapid advances in neuroscience at the present time. ThereBiotechnology Research International 5
Table 4: Examples of concerns about the future of neuropsycho-
pharmacology∗.
- Use of neuropsychological agents as incapacitants
“Aerosols of opioids serve as excellent incapacitants....Russia
deployed this technology in the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre in
2002. The agents were probably fentanyl derivatives...”
- Nanotechnologies...that allow dispersal of highly potent
chemicals over wide areas
“Pharmacological agents are not used as weapons of mass eﬀect,
because their large-scale deployment is impractical....However,
technologies that could be available in the next 20 years would
allow dispersal of agents in delivery vehicles that would be
analogous to a pharmacological cluster bomb or land mine.”
- Technologies for highly potent blood-pressure agents or sensory
speciﬁc pharmacological targeting
“Existing pharmacological agents could be used in a nefarious
way....currently used agents, such as alpha blockers, that would
work quickly to drop blood pressure if delivered in high
doses....anticholinergic agents could cause molecular changes
that lead to temporary blindness.”
- Drug-delivery systems applied to the blood-brain barrier
“New nanotechnologies have allowed molecular conjugation or
encapsulation that may permit unprecedented access to the
brain.”
∗From [8].
can be little doubt about the potential for misuse of
advances in this ﬁeld. A third report by the US National
Academies was prepared by a Committee on Military and
Intelligence Methodology for Emergent Neurophysiological
and Cognitive/Neural Science Research in the Next Two
Decades and was titled Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and
Related Technologies [7]. The chair of the committee is on
record as stating [8]:
“...The very notion of international agree-
ments leads to an implicit belief that traditional
arms control approaches could be relevant to
this domain, when in fact, they are irrelevant.
The pace of development of the technical
areas—neuropharmacology, neuroimaging, and
brain-machine interactions...will outpace the
hysteresisoftheponderousandarcaneprocesses
of traditional security control and disarma-
ment.”
The report itself gives several examples of developments that
could be of concern (Table 4).
It is possible that nonspecialists may view such concerns
about the rate of change in neuroscience research and the
possibilities of misuse as somewhat overstated. It is therefore
useful to examine the views of a distinguished neuroscientist
and very successful communicator of this research ﬁeld to a
wider audience, Professor Steven Ross. He prepared a paper
entitled Prospects and Perils of the New Brain Sciences: A
Twenty Year Timescale [9] for a meeting at the UK Royal
Society in the autumn of 2009. The section and subsections
Table 5: Sections and sub-sections of Prospects and Perils∗.
(1) Introduction
(2) The current state of the neurosciences
(a) The new technologies and their potential
(b) The intellectual landscape
(3) Speciﬁc prospects
(c) New psychopharmaceuticals and pharmacogenetics
(d) Cognitive enhancers
(e) The neuroscience of social control
(h) New military technologies
(4) Ethical, legal and social issues and initiatives
(5) “Free will” in a neurocentric age
(6) Critical themes for the next twenty years
∗From [9].
in Professor Rose’s paper are set out in Table 5 and some are
clearly of particular interest here.
Whilst it is not possible to summarise the whole of
this 48-page paper here, I think it is possible to highlight
some of the points that should give pause for thought
to anyone imagining that we have time on our hands in
regard to the threats posed to the chemical and biological
weapons prohibition regime. In this regard, it is necessary
to understand that Professor Rose is quite sceptical about
someoftheoverhypedclaimsofwhatthecurrentadvancesin
neuroscience may produce in our understanding of the brain
and our ability to manipulate it for good or ill. So, what we
are dealing with is a determinedly conservative estimate of
these advances and their potential impact on society.
Despite such reservations, there is no doubt that signiﬁ-
cant advances have been made and will continue to be made.
As an indicator of the eﬀorts now going into this ﬁeld, Rose
notes:
“...Some 30,000 neuroscientists meet each
year at the annual jamboree of the American
Neuroscience Association, 6000 at the biennial
meetings of the Federation of European Neuro-
sciences. In the US, the NIH entitled the 1990s
the Decade of the Brain, whilst the current
d e c a d eh a sl e s sf o r m a l l yb e c o m ek n o w na st h e
Decade of the Mind...”
What is clear is that a previously rather diverse set of
approaches to studying the brain and behaviour—anatomy,
physiology,genetics,psychology,andinformationsciences—
have increasingly been brought together in a more united
eﬀort. As Rose points out, the name of this ﬁeld—
neuroscience—provides an overarching label within which
the diﬀerent ﬁelds can ﬁt. In his opinion, neuroscience is
certainly one of the fastest growing ﬁelds within the whole
of the life sciences and it is characterised by the importance,
for its own advances, of a new range of technologies and
advances in other sciences. The most powerful of these
supporting technologies, in Rose’s opinion, include brain
imaging, smart pharmacological agents, and mice with
speciﬁc genes inserted or removed (see Table 6).6 Biotechnology Research International
Most people will have seen images taken with the
various techniques which show activity in the brain when
speciﬁc tasks are being undertaken. Rose notes the serious
diﬃcultiesthereareininterpreting exactlywhattheseimages
mean, but these imaging techniques certainly have been a
major advance in linking anatomy and physiology of the
central nervous system. Less well known is single photon
confocal microscopy. Rose’s description of this gives an
indication of the level of sophistication becoming available
to neuroscientists today:
“...Neurons maintained in tissue slices or in
cell culture can be loaded with light sensitive
dyes that respond to the ﬂow of ions such
as calcium into speciﬁc regions of the cell
in response to electrical or pharmacological
signals...”
He points out that this ﬂow can be tracked and “for the
biochemical mechanisms of such cellular responses to be
studied even at the scale of a single synapse.”
It is striking that in his subsection on “smart pharmacol-
ogy” Rose states:
“It is above all in the context of pharmacological
researchthatclassicalneurophysiologybeginsto
intersect with the new cellular, molecular and
even genetic sciences...”
Transmission of information within single neurons is elec-
trical but transmission between neurons is overwhelm-
ingly by chemical means: speciﬁc receptors are aﬀected by
released neurotransmitters or circulating neuromodulators.
As he points out, almost all psychoactive drugs act by
aﬀecting these chemical transmission systems. The genomic
revolution built on this understanding by allowing many
more neuropeptides to be discovered and the nature of the
many neuroreceptors and receptor subtypes to be described.
Thus:
“...Genetic and protein sequencing techniques
enable the structures of individual receptors
to be determined, and thus make it possible
for pharmaceutical companies to engage in
the rational synthesis of molecules designed
to interact precisely with speciﬁc receptors
(“smart” drugs)...”
This, or course, is a step change in capabilities from the
development of older drugs which had much more general
eﬀects.
Combined with such advances has been the development
ofcapabilitiesto“knock in”or“knock out”speciﬁcgenes.As
Rose notes:
“...Indeed mice with almost any speciﬁc gene
modiﬁcation requested by the researcher can
now be purchased oﬀ the shelf from specialist
companies...”
There are complications, of course, in trying to understand
the impact of such modiﬁcations as compensatory adjust-
ments may be made during the animal’s development. Now,
Table 6: Some powerful technologies supporting work in neuro-
science∗.
(a) Advances in direct imaging of the living brain through
functional magnetic resonance imaging...and related
techniques...
(b) “Smart” pharmacological agents and dynamic imaging systems
such as single photon confocal microscopy.
(c) Mice with speciﬁc inserted (“knocked in”) or deleted
(“knocked out”) genes and other “gene-silencing” procedures,
providing animal models for human behavioural and
neurological deﬁcits.
(d) Increased knowledge of the human genome.
∗From [9].
however, new techniques allow a gene to be temporarily
silenced in a speciﬁc brain region of an adult animal. This
is a rapidly developing area of research and:
“...Combined with molecular pharmacology
and cellular physiology, it oﬀers the prospect
of sharper insights into regional localisation,
synaptic function and the molecular systems
underlying behaviour...”
Together, these are powerful capabilities that are bound to
improve our understanding of speciﬁc behaviours in coming
decades.
Rose, however, in his survey of the intellectual landscape,
argues that despite this rich cornucopia of data, the ﬁeld
of neuroscience is “theory poor.” In his view, the diﬀerent
disciplines that have now started to come together have a
long way to go before they have an integrated approach that
might allow an understanding of complex issues such as
the nature of consciousness. Nevertheless, progress is being
made, for example in our understanding of how important
emotions are in cognition. This more biologically based
understanding is, in Rose’s opinion, replacing the older idea
of the brain being some kind of cognitive machine divorced
from the body.
Another sign of the integration of more biologically
based thinking has come from the realisation that there are
very few more genes in humans than in other species:
“...What distinguishes humans from chim-
panzees occurs during development, and the
ways in which the expression of these genes—
that is, their utilisation by particular cells at
particular times in the synthesis of proteins—is
regulated...”
Thus development is:
“...shaped both on environmental contingen-
cies and the actions of a relatively small number
of regulatory genes—genes that control the
expression of others...”
Rose stresses that the role of these regulatory genes has now
comeunderintenseinvestigationandhasledtomuchgreater
emphasis on brain plasticity, and how it changes in responseBiotechnology Research International 7
to experience. As he comments, “(t)he importance of such
a developmental perspective to the understanding of the
adult, long understood by child psychiatrists, is increasingly
coming to the attention of neuroscientists as well.”
“Social” neuroscience seems an odd topic at ﬁrst sight.
As Rose explains, the ﬁnding that apes and humans have
neurons in the brain that are active both when a person
or ape performs a particular action and when others are
observed performing a similar action (“mirror” neurons)
again led neuroscientists to the biological fact that we social
animals! This has quickly led onto the new ﬁeld of social
neuroscience in which “brain events involved in recognising
and responding to others’ feelings and emotions” has come
under scrutiny.
In regard to the speciﬁc prospects of useful materials,
technologies, and knowledge arising from all the research,
Rose might be described as an optimistic pessimist. He sees
many more diﬃculties than one might imagine from the
news headlines, but also thinks there are ways forward that
could produce usable results in the 20 year timescale he
was considering. So, while he thinks the idea of drugs being
developed to ﬁt each individual’s unique genome will not be
economically possible:
“...The economic and health beneﬁts of at
least a broad screening of individuals for rel-
evant genetic markers...before prescribing in
conditions such as depression are likely to be
considerable, despite the well known problems
of false positives and negatives associated with
such screening.”
Similarly, he does not think any cognitive enhancers have
lived up to their promise to date, but:
“...as research in this ﬁeld is moving rapidly
it is highly likely that eﬀective agents will
becomeavailableoverthecomingdecade,ifonly
as a spin-oﬀ from AD (Alzheimer’s Disease)
research...”
Clearly, if this “highly likely” outcome results, Rose also
points out that it will cause ethical, legal, and social issues
for society.
Another debate is likely to arise from other research work
on memory and memory loss. It has been found that:
“...Laboratory animals, trained on a speciﬁc
task, can be made to forget if they are presented
once more with the task situation and given
drugs that block glutamate drugs...”
This has led to the suggestion that people suﬀering from post
traumatic stress disorder could be helped by such methods
and much work in academic and biotech laboratories.
Given the continuing indeterminacy of the diagnosis of
mental illnesses, Rose clearly has considerable concerns over
neuroscience being used forsocial control. As he writes:
“...What is clear is that we are moving into a
world in which psychopharmacological adjust-
ment of an individual’s behaviour to ﬁt within
prescribed norms is becoming common and can
only become increasingly so with advances in
the sophistication of the available pharmaceuti-
cals.”
Yet, in addition to all of the other questions that such
procedures pose, we have little idea of the long-term eﬀects
of routine use of such psychoactive drugs.
Professor Rose also has concerns about military interest
in some of these developments. He notes that US interest in
the use of LSD and other drugs has been well documented
for the Cold War period. However, he states:
“...Less well known has been the scale of
research in the US, Europe and Russia, on
new generations of “non-lethal” agents....The
intended function of these substances is to
produce temporary incapacitation by aﬀecting
sensory or motor systems but without lasting
adverse eﬀects...”
and points out that the developments come to the attention
of the general public in 2002 with “the disastrous attempt by
Russian special forces to release hostages held in a Moscow
theatre.” I shall return to this issue at the end of the paper,
but ﬁrst I wish to give a speciﬁc illustration of how advances
in neuroscience could facilitate eﬀective misuse.
5.Snifﬁng Neuropeptides
One of the most startling examples of the rate of change
in neuroscience research concerns the sleep disorder, nar-
colepsy. This very disabling condition involves considerable
disruption of sleep, and in particular, instances of catalepsy
in which muscle tone is suddenly lost. Little was understood
about the cause of this condition until the late 1990s
although it was clear that some dogs suﬀered from inherited
(i.e., genetically caused) narcolepsy. Then, in the late 1990s,
two research groups announced that they had discovered
two new neuropeptides in the brain. These have been
named orexins (or hypocretins). It rapidly became clear that
disruption of the production of these neuropeptides or the
receptors for them was the cause of narcolepsy. Although
in humans inherited narcolepsy is very rare, most people
suﬀering from the condition lack these neuropeptides—it is
thought because of an autoimmune condition. The orexins
appear to be important because they stabilise the waking
condition and in their absence the waking and sleeping
systems become unstable. Clearly, if it were possible to
interfere with the function of the orexins then there would
be available to those with malign intent an impressive means
of incapacitation.
Thisbecomesofinterestbecauseofrecentworkononeof
the earliest known of the neuropeptides. Oxytocin has long
been known to be involved in the regulation of aspects of
reproductive and social attachment behaviour. It was dis-
cussed, for instance, in the 1991 Canadian paper mentioned8 Biotechnology Research International
earlier. In 2005, Nature c a r r i e dap a p e ro nag a m ep l a y e d
by two human subjects which showed quite clearly that a
dose of oxytocin given through the nose (intranasal delivery)
considerably increased the trust shown by the person who
had received the oxytocin. Not surprisingly, this caused a
great deal of interest and led to much follow-on work. For
example, it was shown that oxytocin delivered via this route
signiﬁcantly reduced the activation of the amygdala response
to the viewing of threatening faces. The amygdala, of course,
is crucial to the processing of responses to threat. It has
also been shown more recently that oxytocin’s impact on the
person’s behaviour in the original game persists even if their
trusthasbeenbreachedseveraltimesbytheotherplayer[10].
The way that drugs pass from the nose to the brain is
not yet entirely clear and may well vary for diﬀerent drugs.
Transportoftheoxytocinalongtheolfactorynervesfromthe
sensory endings in the nose direct to the brain is a possibility,
but too slow for the rapid eﬀects seen. The nose also has
multiple blood vessels and passage through the blood to the
brain is also possible. A diﬀerent possibility arises because,
unlikeotherneurons,theolfactoryreceptorneurons—which
are regularly in contact with environmental toxins—are
regenerated about every 3-4 weeks. Furthermore, the special
olfactory ensheathing cells that surround the axons of the
olfactory receptor cells stay in place so the new olfactory
receptor neurons can pass through them. As this regenera-
tion process is always going on for some olfactory receptor
neurons the nasal barriers to entry into the brain could well
bemuchmore“leaky”thanelsewhere,wheretheblood-brain
barrier aﬀords greater protection against the entry of poten-
tially psychoactive chemicals. From the perspective of this
paper, what is crucial to understand is that there are many
ways in which the eﬃciency of delivery via the intranasal
route might be increased. These include encapsulation of the
drug so that it is more soluble at the nasal epithelium, the
addition of vasoconstrictors to the aerosol to reduce clear-
anceofthedrug,ortheuseofnanoparticlesthathaveligands
to bind to the epithelial cell surface to carry the drug [11].
This route of delivery has also been shown to be eﬀective
in altering the sleep system of primates. Animals that had
been deprived of sleep and were performing badly on a
cognitive task were shown to improve if given intravenous
or intranasal orexin. Signiﬁcantly, the investigators reported
that [12]:
“...delivery of orexin-A via the nasal
route was...more potent because the nasal
spray...was only...1/10 of the most eﬀective
i.v. dose.”
Since orexin antagonists are also known to aﬀect the sleep
cycle in man (i.e., by enhancing the sleep system rather than
the waking system), the malign possibilities for incapacita-
tion by this route are obvious (see Table 4,s e c o n di t e m ) .
6. Maintainingthe Prohibition?
Given the wording of Article I of the BTWC and the agreed
statements at successive Five-Year Review Conferences, par-
ticularly in 2006, it may be asked what reason there is to be
concerned about scientiﬁc and technological developments
threatening the future of the BTWC. First, of course, as
Robinson has cogently argued [13], in present and likely
future wars “amongst the people” chemical and biological
weapons could seem particularly attractive to some of the
participants and thus there could be an erosion of the
prohibition by actions taken on the ground. The fact that
developments in the life and associated sciences might well
make the development of eﬀective chemical and biological
weapons easier and more accessible to substate groups could
clearly accelerate a degenerative process if it got underway.
A more immediate threat, it seems to me, comes from
the interest that developed states have shown, as Professor
Rose noted, in the potential use of new forms of so-called
“nonlethal” chemical weapons. Clearly, there is a major
question as to why incapacitating chemicals should be called
“nonlethal” weapons when the diﬃculties of controlling air
concentrations after dispersal and diﬀerential responses to
any given dose make it unlikely there will not be deaths if
such agents are used on a large scale, as happened in the
2002 Moscow theatre siege. Nevertheless, as chemistry and
biology become increasingly indistinguishable and the CWC
and BTWC overlap in their coverage of midspectrum agents
such as bioregulators, a threat to the CWC could obviously
impact on the BTWC.
Though the CWC was negotiated twenty years later than
the BTWC and is generally regarded as being much stronger,
there is a potentially damaging loophole at the heart of the
CWC. This is caused by one of the peaceful purposes being
stated in Article II.9 (d) as [14]:
“Law enforcement including domestic riot con-
trol purposes.”
Clearly, on a natural reading of that sentence law enforce-
ment is a wider category than domestic riot control and
therefore there could be law enforcement chemicals other
than domestic riot control agents. As law enforcement is not
deﬁnedintheCWC,somepeoplemightwellarguethatnovel
law enforcement incapacitating chemicals (like fentanyl
derivatives) could be legally used in various situations.
Should that become evidenced in further state practice, it
is diﬃcult to see where the process of development of new
incapacitants might end.
It can be argued that as there is no such exemption for
law enforcement in the BTWC, the best approach is to “let
sleepingdogslie”andnotraisetheissueoftheso-callednon-
lethal agents in regard to the BTWC. A danger then is that
if State Practice develops so as to erode the prohibition in
regard to the CWC, would not the argument then be made
that law enforcement was an equally “peaceful purpose”
under the BTWC?
In any event, it does seem that the present ﬁve-yearly
somewhat ad hoc review system for scientiﬁc and technolog-
ical developments relevant to the BTWC needs itself to be
carefully reviewed and other possibilities considered at the
Seventh Review Conference in 2011. There is, of course, a
wide range of diﬀerent mechanisms available in the toolkit
of diplomatic negotiators in order to accomplish this task
[15]. The CWC, for example, has a Scientiﬁc Advisory BoardBiotechnology Research International 9
and an emergent tradition of receiving a broadly based
report from the International Union of Pure and Applied
Chemistry(IUPAC)beforeitsFive-YearReviewConferences.
However, to have a Scientiﬁc Advisory Board suggests that
there is an organisation to request and receive reports, and
for an NGO to prepare a broadly based ﬁve-yearly review
suggest that an oﬃcial of the organisation similarly has
to request and receive the report. Given the history of
the “institutional deﬁcit” of the BTWC and the long-term
diﬃculties of correcting that deﬁcit, it seems unlikely that
such mechanisms could be agreed for the BTWC in 2011.
A more likely step forward might be for the present
annual meetings to become more systematic, including reg-
ular agenda items such as a review of relevant scientiﬁc and
technological developments and perhaps backup by a scien-
tiﬁcadvisory panel associatedwithastrengthenedsecretariat
[16]. The question then is how can practicing neuroscientists
be engaged in providing their expertise in order to help
protect their benignly intended work from misuse? That, in
my opinion, will require an expansion of their awareness of
the responsibilities they bear for these potentially bad as well
as the good societal impacts of their work [17].
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